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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES  
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TASK FORCE REPORTS (U)

The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense,  
dated 10 February 1961, together with its attachments  
(Appendices "A", "B", and "C"), is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat.

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Source: I got this from  
David Buchanan

ENCLOSURE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

10 February 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
SUBJECT: Task Force Reports

This memorandum will confirm my verbal instructions at OSD staff meetings, the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting of 24 January, and our discussions at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 6 February. At those meetings I asked that the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs follow the work of the four Defense studies in progress and identify as early as possible those areas where agreement cannot be reached. It is my plan to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries as early as possible on any points of difference that arise incident to these four studies. Rough drafts of the four papers, including proposed adjustments to the FY '62 budgets, should be ready for our review on approximately February 15. As you are aware, the target date for completion of these four tasks is 20 February.

Attached for your information are my notes\* which serve as initial guidance to the individuals responsible for strategic weapons, limited war situations, and R&D studies.

/s/ ROBERT S. McNAMARA

\* Appendices "A", "B", and "C"

APPENDIX "A"

REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS

1. Requirements for strategic weapons are based on the following assumptions:

- a. that we will not strike first with such weapons,
- b. that we must have sufficient forces on hand to survive a surprise attack which will place against us the full power of the USSR and its associated satellites,
- c. that the force which remains after such surprise attack will be sufficient to destroy:

- i. all of the missile sites of the Soviet Union and its associates.

- ii. the other war-making capacity of the Soviet Union and its associates.

2. In applying these assumptions, we estimate:

- a. The Russian strategic attack capability, by year, is X.
- b. Our losses from Russian attack, by year, would be X.

3. Based on the objective stated above and the assumptions stated above, our force requirements to accomplish the objectives would be as follows, by year --

4. Compared to these force requirements our presently approved programs, including the proposed Eisenhower FY 62 budget, will provide the following by weapons systems -- by year --

5. The deficiencies in the force requirements by year are shown --

6. The alternative ways of overcoming the deficiencies are --

- a. reduce the loss to our force resulting from the USSR surprise attack by reducing vulnerability through airborne alert, strengthening air defense systems, etc.

- b. increase the delivery capacity of the force that remains after the attack by the following alternatives -- (show for each of the alternatives the cost and time required to accomplish compared to other alternatives).

Conclusion: Our approved forces are either deficient or provide a surplus capacity in relation to our objectives, and analysis indicates the following adjustments are appropriate.

APPENDIX "B"

REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITED WAR SITUATIONS

1. Present US limited war capabilities consist of:
  - a. 3 STRAC divisions (2 airborne and 1 infantry) supported by the Air Force through CASAF and other TAC elements.
  - b. Airlift provided by TAC troop carrier wings and MATS.
  - c. Navy sealift and Marine forces.
2. These forces are estimated as providing for not more than one substantial limited war situation at a time without drawing on forces deployed outside of the United States, such as the 5 division force in Europe, the 2 divisions in Korea, 1 division in Hawaii, and a Marine division in Okinawa. To re-deploy these forces for a limited war situation not provided for by the capability described under 1. above, the following is available:
  - a. Airlift (describe)
  - b. Sealift (describe)
3. The present limited war forces are equipped as follows:

(here describe extent to which presently available equipment has been modernized and is air-transportable and yearly rate at which modernization is increasing under currently approved programs.)
4. Assuming that the US is called upon to use its own forces in one or more limited war situations at the same time in both the Far East and the European-African areas, the following are the additional forces that would be required:
  - a. Army. (such as increasing STRAC or, alternatively, re-deploying overseas Army forces, and effect on present Army modernization.)
  - b. Air Force. (increasing both tactical air and airlift.)
  - c. Navy. (increasing sealift, Marine forces, etc.)
5. The foregoing assumes the following use of presently-provided-for Reserves:
  - a. Army
  - b. Air Force
  - c. Marine Corps

APPENDIX "C"

PROJECTS FOR REVIEW IN THE R & D AREA

1. Review of military space programs approved or under consideration including study of appropriate organization for management of such programs within the Defense Department, in each case in the light of the criticisms and recommendations made in the Weisner Report 1-10-61.\*

2. Review of controversial projects which have not yet been fully approved and which should be the subject of firm decisions by the time final action is required on the FY '62 budget, such projects including:

B-70

SKYBOLT

DYNASOAR

ANP

MISSILEER-EAGLE

TYPHON

MREM

STOL

NIKE-ZEUS

CX-1

\* Not on file in Joint Secretariat

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Appendix "C"

from  
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
Record Group No. ~~1000000~~

RG 218, Records of the United  
States Joint Chiefs of Staff

662 3001 Basic National Security Policy  
(10 Feb 1961)